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Access to impartial and effective courts is the cornerstone 
of democratic civil society. When the intention of political 
actors is to extinguish democratic civil society, they often 
wear away at the autonomy of the judiciary. International 
law and the constitutions of many states throughout the 
world guarantee access to autonomous courts. Despite 
having such guarantees in place, the government of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has consistently attacked 
the judiciary in order to erode its autonomy and bring it 
under political control. Strategies used to achieve that goal 
include purging judges, intimidating them, and preventing 
judges from getting tenure. As a result, today there are two 
parallel Venezuelan judiciaries competing for authority 
while citing to the same constitution. This article will 
present evidence regarding the methods through which the 
autonomy of Venezuela’s courts was intentionally 
destroyed by the Chavista government. It will begin by 
looking at the history of the judicial power created by the 
Constitution of 1999, analyze the specific acts that led to 
the politicization of the courts, and explore the effects of 
that politicization on Venezuelan constitutional 
government. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The autonomous judiciary is a fundamental component of the 
administration of justice. For that reason, guaranteeing access to 
fair, independent, and autonomous courts is a basic human right. 
Article 10 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights entitles all humans “in full equality to a fair . . . hearing by 
an independent and impartial tribunal.”1 The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that no person 
shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law, it 
guarantees speedy trials for the accused, and prohibits inhuman 
 
 1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. 
A/810, art. 10 (1948). 
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treatment for prisoners.2  Such rules ensure the autonomy of the 
courts as well as the independence from judges’ influence. But 
what happens when politicians intentionally blur the lines 
separating the branches of government to the point that judicial 
autonomy and independence is effectively extinguished? That is 
the case of the supreme court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia or 
“TSJ”) of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, a country which 
has adopted and ratified both the UN’s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
Venezuelan politicians undermined the independence of the 
judicial branch of government by ignoring the separation of 
powers set forth in the country’s constitution.3 In doing so, they 
violated obligations under international treaties and the nation’s 
constitution. The current Venezuelan constitution was adopted in 
1999 (the “Constitution of 1999”) and completely reformed the 
judicial, executive, and legislative branches of government.4 The 
Constitution of 1999 intended to create a socialist republic that 
guaranteed democratic, human, and social rights.5 In practice, 
however, the new constitution weakened the institutions of 
government6 while the executive branch steadily grew more 
powerful. The year 2017 became a watershed year when the TSJ 
nullified the legislature and ruled that the nation’s president may 
unilaterally convene a constituent assembly to craft a new 
 
 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
175-76 (1966). 
 3 See generally THE CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF 
VENEZUELA Dec. 20, 1999. See also Acceso a la Justicia califica al TSJ como 
politizado y parcializado, RUNRUN.ES (Jan. 10, 2017), 
https://runrun.es/nacional/292643/acceso-a-la-justicia-califica-al-tsj-como-
politizado-y-parcializado/. 
 4 Marion J. Garcia-Serra, The Enabling Law: The Demise of the Separation 
of Powers in Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 265, 
274. 
 5 Reportajes (Vive Television broadcast Feb. 02, 1999), YOUTUBE (Feb. 
02, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1s7rtjHqwnQ. 
 6 Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 275. 
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constitution.7 By nullifying the legislature, the judicial power in 
Venezuela effectively cut the string of constitutional democratic 
government and participated in an internal coup. As a result, 
opposition politicians established a parallel legislature and judicial 
in exile.8 
This article will present evidence regarding the methods 
through which the autonomy of Venezuela’s courts was 
intentionally destroyed. It will begin by looking at the history of 
the judicial power created by the Constitution of 1999, analyze the 
specific acts that led to the politicization of the courts, and explore 
the effects of that politicization on Venezuelan constitutional 
government. Part II of this article will explore the promulgation of 
the Constitution of 1999 and the historical context that led to its 
downfall. Part III will delve into the intentional undermining of 
democratic government through the erosion of judicial 
independence by the Venezuelan government, looking specifically 
at the Organic Law of the TSJ, the practice of appointing judges to 
untenured temporary positions, the ouster of judges, and the case 
of Judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni. Part IV will delve into the final 
collapse of the Venezuelan judicial, when the TSJ cut the string of 
constitutional government in Venezuela and shattered its 
legitimacy. Lastly, Part V will sum up the current state of the 
Venezuelan judiciary and democratic government as established by 
the Constitution of 1999. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A.  A History of the Constitution of 1999 
The story of the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 begins “with 
the fall of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in January of 1958.”9 The 
change in regime led to the Constitution of 1961, which ushered in 
 
 7 Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El Juez Constitucional vs. El Pueblo Como 
Poder Constituyente Originario, 119 EDITORIAL JURIDICA VENEZOLANA, at 3-5 
(2017)(Sp.). 
 8 Acceso a la Justicia califica al TSJ como politizado y parcializado, supra 
note 3. 
 9 Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 266. 
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an extended period of prosperity and “an uninterrupted sequence of 
peaceful and democratic transitions of power.”10 From the outside, 
Venezuela seemed to be a model democratic society compared to 
its neighbors in Latin America.11 However, internally, many 
Venezuelans felt excluded from the political process.12 Political 
life was dominated by two centrists parties, Accion Democratica ( 
“AD”) and Copei.13  
Both political parties–along with a third party called the URD 
that did not survive the 1970s–came to a power-sharing agreement, 
by which they committed themselves to democratic government 
and procedures when in power, and to serve as the “loyal 
opposition” when out of power.14 An agreement called the Pact of 
Punto Fijo.15 The Constitution of 1961 lent itself to the duopoly of 
the Pact of Punto Fijo because that constitution was loosely 
modeled on the United States’ Constitution. It had a tripartite 
system in which a Presidente headed the executive, the legislature 
was a bicameral institution called the Congreso Nacional (National 
Congress), and the judicial branch was headed by a Corte Suprema 
de Justicia (Supreme Court).16 
The Supreme Court established by the Constitution of 1961 
was a continuation of the Supreme Court first established by the 
Constitution of 1830, which was the first constitution enacted after 
Venezuela split from Simon Bolivar’s unified Gran Colombia that 
same year.17 That Supreme Court was originally made up of a chief 
magistrate and four other magistrates.18 When there was a vacancy 
in the court, the president would nominate three potential 
magistrates for each open seat, which were narrowed to two 
 
 10 Id.  
 11 Id.  
 12 Ricardo Combellas, El Proceso Constituyente y la Constitucion de 1999, 
30 POLITEIA 183, 184 (2003). 
 13 Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 267. 
 14 Id. at 268.  
 15 Id.  
 16 See generally VENEZ. CONST. OF 1961. 
 17 Constitucion de Venezuela de 1830 cumple 184 anos (Sep. 22 2016); 
MINISTERIO DEL PODER POPULAR PARA LA COMUNICACIÓN Y LA INFORMACIÓN, 
http://www.minci.gob.ve/constitucion-de-venezuela-de-1830-cumple-186-anos/.  
 18 See generally VENEZ. CONST. OF 1830, tit. 20. 
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candidates by the Camara de Representantes (analogous to the 
United States House of Representative); then the Senado 
(analogous to the United States Senate) would elect a final 
candidate from amongst those two.19 This procedure for selecting 
judges incorporated the will of the people through the important 
roles reserved for each house of the National Congress as well as 
the presidency.20 While the Constitution of 1961 doubled the total 
number of magistrates in the Supreme Court, the method for 
selecting magistrates and required qualifications remained the 
same as under the Constitution of 1830.21 
 However, the people’s confidence in the institutions 
established by the Constitution of 1961 was eroded by widespread 
nepotism and public corruption, which was rarely prosecuted.22 By 
the 1980s, an insular political class had formed and many 
Venezuelans felt that the political class was increasingly unable to 
effectively respond to the nation’s woes.23 In that context of 
political cronyism and corruption, the judicial branch of 
government was often questioned for its ineffectiveness and 
partiality.24 
Although the Constitution of 1961 was not replaced until 1999, 
there were many attempts to reform the Constitution of 1961 
before the rise of Chavismo—with criticism of the Corte Suprema 
being one of the main driving forces in favor of reform.25 By 1984, 
the Congreso Nacional had created a commission to reform the 
laws governing the judiciary.26 Those reforms proved to be 
insufficient and in 1989 the National Congress formed another 
commission with the express mandate to propose amendments to 
the Constitution of 1961.27 (At that point the constitution had 
already been amended in 1973 and 1983, but those amendments 
 
 19 Id. 
 20 Combellas, supra note 12, at 184. 
 21 Id.  
 22 Id. 
 23 Id.  
 24 Id.  
 25 Id. at 186. 
 26 Id. at 185. 
 27 Id. 
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had not affected the judiciary.)28 The 1989 commission released an 
extensive list of proposed amendments just two years later.29 
However, that list bitterly divided the members of the government 
and constitutional reform was never adopted.30  
The ruling parties’ inability to deal with the problems facing 
Venezuelan society became clear on three separate occasions, 
which compounded and simmered for nearly a decade: “Black 
Friday,” the Caracazo, and the failed military coup of 1992.31 
Those events shook the foundations of Venezuelan civil society to 
the core and eventually resulted in the overhaul of the entire 
Venezuelan government by a young lieutenant coronel who was 
unknown at the time. 
February 18, 1983 was “Black Friday.”32 The Venezuelan 
currency, the Bolivar, “was severely devalued as a result of high 
level of foreign debt and the declining price of oil. Most 
Venezuelan’s [sic] living standards were affected detrimentally 
and the flow of ‘petro-dollars’ that had financed generous social 
policies and helped maintain the political patronage machines of 
the two major political parties began to recede.”33 The inability to 
pay for social programs, let alone expand them to draw in new 
voters, further undermined respect for the political duopoly that 
had dominated Venezuela since the Pact of Punto Fijo.34 
Then, on February 27, 1989, popular frustration with the 
traditional elite boiled over.35 Carlos Andres Perez, a one-time 
president from the 1970s, won the presidency once more with 
promises of increasing prosperity.36 He pushed reforms that 
reduced government spending, but were very unpopular with the 
struggling lower classes.37 An increase to the price of bus fare 
“ignited a three day riot [in Caracas], resulting in extensive looting 
 
 28 Id. 185 n.2. 
 29 Id. at 185. 
 30 Id. at 186. 
 31 Id. at 184. 
 32 Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 267. 
 33 Id.  
 34 Id.  
 35 Id.  
 36 Id. at 268.  
 37 Id.  
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and over 1000 deaths,” which needed to be put down with the use 
of military force.38 The Venezuelan people had shown deep-rooted 
discontent with the political elite. Speaking of the Caracazo some 
years later, President Rafael Caldera (Copei), who served from 
1995-1999, said that “Venezuela has been a sort of pilot country. 
At this moment, it is what the North Americans call a show 
window . . . . That show window was shattered with fists, stones, 
and sticks, by the hungry inhabitants of the barrios of Caracas.”39 
President Caldera had tapped into a latent, yet incredibly 
powerful sentiment in Venezuelan society: that the government 
was rotten from the inside and needed rebuilding.40 In time, a 
young army lieutenant coronel named Hugo Chávez Frias would 
learn how to harness that political energy and remake the country. 
Chávez was the leader of “a small cadre of junior military officers, 
that had earlier complained of the politicized system of promotions 
and of their new found duties of repressing popular protests, 
[which] organized themselves as the Movimiento Bolivariano 
Revolucionario – 200 (“MBR – 200”).”41 With no official political 
ideology, the cadre was united by a shared sense that the 
government was failing the people and that a great change was 
necessary.42 On February 1992, the MBR – 200, leading about a 
tenth of all army units in the country, mutinied and attempted to 
take over the government.43 Shortly after it began, the rebellion 
was quelled and the coup plotters arrested.44 Chávez was 
incarcerated for his role in the coup. 
B.  Constitutional Reform in 1999 
Hugo Chávez attained the status of a political celebrity and 
within a few years of MBR – 200’s attempted coup, President 
Rafael Caldera released Chávez from prison.45 By the time of his 
 
 38 Id. at 269. 
 39 Combellas, supra note 12, at 184. 
 40 Id. at 193. 
 41 Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 270. 
 42 Id. at 270.  
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. at 271. 
 45 Id. at 272. 
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release from prison, Chavez was a hero to the poor and 
disenfranchised of Venezuela.46 The way was clear for an 
ambitious political outsider to sweep aside the duopoly of AD and 
Copei in the 1998 presidential elections.  
Chávez was an optimistic visionary, who presented a 
persuasive and idealistic vision of what the country could be.47 He 
promised to spread the wealth from the nation’s vast reserves of 
natural resources on programs to help the poor; to create a more 
equitable and gentler nation where the poor and the historically-
marginalized indigenous population could have access to 
prosperity.48 Canny observers noticed that “[h]is message of 
overturning the entire political and economic order proved to have 
. . . appeal to the impoverished masses who were eager for 
dramatic change.”49 Chávez named his vision “21st Century 
Socialism,” and assembled a political coalition which came to be 
called the Movimiento Quinta Republica (Movement for a Fifth 
Republic, the “MVR”). This vision was wildly popular, and 
Chávez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (“PSUV”) swept 
aside all other parties to triumph on election day in 1998.50 
The vehicle through which Hugo Chávez sought to implement 
21st Century Socialism was a new constitution.51 While 
campaigning for the presidency, he turned the convocation of a 
constituent assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution into a 
central issue of the election.52 He intended to hold a referendum to 
ensure that his proposed new constitution had a popular mandate, 
but the Constitution of 1961 did not establish a mechanism for 
such popular referendums.53  
 
 46 Lauren Castaldi, Judicial Independence Threatened in Venezuela: The 
Removal of Venezuelan Judges and the Complications of Rule of Law Reform, 
37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 477, 479 (2006). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id.  
 49 Id.  
 50 Id.  
 51 Combellas, supra note 12, at 188. 
 52 Id.  
 53 Allan R. Brewer-Carias, La Configuración Judicial del Proceso 
Constituyente en Venezuela de 1999 o de Como el Guardian de la Constitución 
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Already throughout the 1998 presidential campaign, the 
Supreme Court had cast doubts as to the legality of such a 
referendum. The Supreme Court had to weigh the underlaying 
principles of democratic participation against their obligation to 
uphold the Constitution of 1961.54 In January 1999, that court 
handed the MVR a limited victory by holding that a referendum 
could take place, but that such a referendum could not vest the 
government with the authority to create institution tasked with 
drafting a new constitution.55 Instead, the referendum could only 
be used to gauge the people’s wishes as to whether they wanted a 
new constitution and what types of guarantees that constitution 
should provide.56 
The referendum was held in April 1999 and resulted in an 
overwhelming victory for the MVR government.57 Demonstrating 
his strong political support, Chávez was able to win the 
referendum by a margin of 92% in favor and 8% in opposition.58 In 
July of the same year, another election was held for representatives 
to the Constituent Assembly.59 Chávez’s coalition of leftist parties, 
the Polo Patriotico, was able to win 121 out of a total of 128 
members (the assembly had a total of 131 seats, 3 of those being 
reserved for representatives from indigenous groups).60 With about 
60% of the total votes, the Polo Patriotico won over 90% of 
available seats.61  
However, it is worth noting that there was widespread 
abstention by the Venezuelan electorate. Slightly less than 38% of 
eligible voters participated in the July election.62 For comparison, 
about 64% of the electorate participated in the 1998 presidential 
 
Abrió el Camino a Su Violación y Para su Propia Extinción, N° 77-80 REVISTA 
DE DERECHO PUBLICO, 453 (1999).  
 54 Id at 456. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 273. 
 58 Id.  
 59 Id. 
 60 Combellas, supra note 12, at 193. 
 61 Id. at 193. 
 62 Id. at 192 n.17. 
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election.63 Those high rates of abstention in the elections for 
members of the Constituent Assembly are in large part due to the 
questionable legality of the Constituent Assembly of 1999. Given 
that there was no mechanism for establishing such an assembly in 
the Constitution of 1961, the binding nature and legitimacy of the 
referendum were widely questioned by the opposition to the MVR 
government.64 
After their overwhelming electoral victories, the MVR 
government barred Congress from sitting in the Venezuelan 
Capitol and from meeting and passing new laws.65 They then 
removed eight judges from the bench.66 Opposition legislators who 
attempted to enter the Venezuelan Capitol were removed by armed 
forces.67 Finally, Cecilia Rosa, the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, who had just months earlier given the Constituent Assembly 
a limited mandate that expressly prohibited the dissolution of the 
Congress and the Supreme Court, resigned, “stating that the court 
would commit suicide rather than wait to be killed by the 
[Constituent] Assembly.”68 Allan Brewer-Carias, a renowned and 
influential Venezuelan jurist, who participated in the 1999 
Constituent Assembly as an independent scholar, called the 
Supreme Court’s decision to allow the referendum, which created 
the “death sentence” of the autonomous judicial power in 
Venezuela.69 
The 1999  Constituent Assembly operated under a theory of 
super-sovereignty, the idea that because the Constituent Assembly 
was the result of a popular referendum and the leaders were all 
 
 63 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 1998 Presidential Election Results, 
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY: BASE DE DATOS POLITICOS DE LAS AMERICAS (Apr. 
5, 2006) http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Venezuela/pre98.html; 




 64 Brewer-Carias, supra note 53, at 27. 
 65 Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 273. 
 66 Id. at 274. 
 67 Id.  
 68 Id.  
 69 Brewer-Carias, supra note 53, at 1. 
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elected, the Constituent  Assembly was the supreme representation 
of the popular will and sovereignty.70 Under this theory, the 
traditional branches of government were all subservient to the 
Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly used that claim 
to authority to replace Congress as the nation’s legislative body.71 
Those usurped legislative powers were then used to pass an 
Enabling Law72 that gave President Chávez expanded emergency 
powers to enact laws that would otherwise have needed legislative 
approval.73 President Chávez argued that the expanded powers 
were necessary to combat the “emergencies” of high inflation and 
a 10% unemployment rate. While Enabling Laws were permitted 
under the Constitution of 1961 in cases of emergency, this was the 
first time that such a law was passed without the participation of 
Congress and the first time that the emergency powers were not 
limited by scope and duration.74  
The Constitution of 1999 was approved in a referendum by 
71% of participating voters.75 However, due to the controversies 
surrounding the Constitution of 1999, its reception was mixed. On 
its face, the Constitution of 1999 is inherently democratic and 
respects human rights.76 However, the years have shown that 
implementation of the constitution has failed to ensure those 
ideals.77  
The Constituent Assembly itself undermined the constitutional 
system that it had recently established. Not only did the 
Constituent Assembly intentionally undermine the legislative and 
judicial branches of government, it also suspended the local 
elections for the year 2000, failed to follow adequate formalities 
 
 70 Combellas, supra note 12, at 195. 
 71 Id.  
 72 An enabling law is, a “law that permits what was previously prohibited or 
that creates new powers; esp., a congressional statute conferring powers on an 
executive agency to carry out various delegated tasks.” ENABLING LAW, Black's 
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
 73 Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 274. 
 74 Id. at 274-75. 
 75 Id. at 276. 
 76 See generally CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE 
VENEZUELA Dec. 20, 1999, (Venez.). 
 77 Combellas, supra note 12, at 205. 
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(going so far as to change the text of the constitution after it was 
approved by referendum), and created a transitional government 
that was not elected, but appointed.78 By its acts, the Constituent 
Assembly condemned the newly renamed  Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela to caudillo-style leadership.79 “One political observer 
described [the Constitution of 1999] as establishing a political and 
economic model that was ‘part Arab oil kingdom, part European 
cradle-to-grave welfare state, with a dash of Latin American 
authoritarianism thrown in.’”80 
The Constitution of 1999 was an expansive document with 350 
articles.81 The articles covered the structure and form of 
government, as well as a wide array of social policies, rights, and 
protections. For example, it gave the government increased powers 
to intervene in the economy for the benefit of workers and 
stipulated that the national oil company could not be privatized, as 
its revenue was intended to pay for social programs.82 It overturned 
existing labor laws and set a minimum wage that must be based on 
the price of a basket of basic goods.83 The Constitution of 1999 
guaranteed universal healthcare, education, pension, and 
employment.84 
The Constitution of 1999 significantly changed the structure of 
government. The Supreme Court was replaced by the TSJ.85 The 
bicameral Congress was replaced with the unicameral National 
Assembly which had the power to pass Enabling Laws that gave 
the president the power to enact legislation by decree.86 Aside from 
such expanded powers, the president was given the right to call 
referendums on national issues at will and to dissolve the National 
Assembly.87  
 
 78 Id. at 206.  
 79 Id.  
 80 Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 275. 
 81 Combellas, supra note 12, at 203. 
 82 Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 275. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See generally CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE 
VENEZUELA Dec. 20, 1999, (Venez.). 
 86 Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 276. 
 87 Id.  
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Many years after the adoption of the Constitution of 1999, the 
famous Venezuelan jurist Allan Brewer-Carias wrote that the 
actions of the Constituent Assembly constituted an internal coup 
d’état.88 This was partially because there were widespread 
irregularities in the process to draft a new constitution. The 
referendum calling for the Constituent Assembly was called well 
before the Supreme Court ruled that such a vote was 
constitutionally permissible under the Constitution of 1961, and 
was therefore illegally organized.89 When the Supreme Court 
allowed the referendum, it gave the Constituent Assembly a 
limited mandate which the Constituent Assembly ignored under 
the theory of super-sovereignty.90 The dissolution of the Congress 
as well as the disregard of the Supreme Court by the Constituent 
Assembly meant that the Constituent Assembly had violated the 
Constitution of 1961, which was still in effect despite the 
Constituent Assembly’s belief that it outranked the institutions of 
government created by the 1961 Constitution.91  
Another important component of the Constitution of 1999 is 
Title III Chapter I, which states in clear and unequivocal terms that 
the Constitution of 1999 recognizes and shall comply with human 
rights obligations under national law as well as international 
treaty.92 It provides that human rights protections guaranteed by 
treaty obligations shall be guaranteed to the people, even when 
those protections are more expansive than the guarantees provided 
under the 1999 Constitution,.93 As signatories to such treaties, 
Venezuela’s obligations include guaranteeing fair and public trials 
as well as procedural guarantees of due process. The Constitution 
also states that equal protection under the law shall be given to all 
Venezuelans regardless of political opinion so that all Venezuelans 
are granted equality of human rights and liberties.94  
 
 88 Brewer-Carias, supra note 53, at 1-2. 
 89 Id.  
 90 Id. at 52. 
 91 Id. at 53. 
 92 CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA Dec. 20, 
1999, art. 19 (Venez.). 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id.  
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After winning a majority in Congress in 1999, MVR politicians 
isolated the Supreme Court. Ivan Rincon Urdaneta, a supporter of 
President Chavez, argued that the Supreme Court had 
impermissibly limited the Constituent Assembly.95 Foreseeing 
imminent destruction, the justices of the Supreme Court dissolved 
the institution. After the adoption of the Constitution of 1999, Mr. 
Rincon was rewarded for his loyalty by being appointed as the 
president of the newly created the TSJ.96 
III. ASSAULT: HOW THE MVR GOVERNMENT USED 
INTIMIDATION TO DESTROY JUDICIAL AUTONOMY. 
 
The Constitution of 1999 did not create a judicial branch that 
was subservient to the other branches of government per se; 
instead, the actions of MVR politicians undermined judicial 
autonomy. This section will look at the practices of the PSUV 
government that served to destroy any notion of judicial autonomy 
and independence in Venezuela.  
Judicial autonomy is a requirement for democratic government 
because the judiciary is the branch of government which ensures 
that constitutional rules are followed. In a jurisdiction where the 
judiciary is subservient to any or all other branches of government, 
there is no institution which can hold the rest of the government 
accountable. Absent a judiciary that is equal to the other branches 
of government, the trappings of government serve as nothing more 
than mere camouflage for despotism and tyranny. Judges protect 
the people from those who would otherwise usurp the state’s 
monopoly of force to become untouchable. That protection is not 
only fundamental for democratic governance, it is an important 
human right that countries must respect under international law. 
A.  The Organic Law of 2004 
Chapter III of the Constitution of 1999 established the nation’s 
judiciary in about twenty articles, which created a set of complex 
 
 95 Brewer-Carias, supra note 53, at 52. 
 96 Id. 
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rules for the judiciary.97  The rules created an independent 
judiciary where magistrates have tenure for twelve years and are 
chosen through popular participation.98 The Constitution expressly 
sets minimum qualifications and coopted Venezuela’s legal scholar 
community to ensure that judges elected by the masses were 
qualified to hold their title.99 Article 267 set behavioral and 
professional guidelines as well as a mechanism for the ouster of 
tenured judges.100 According to its text, the judicial branch created 
by the Constitution of 1999 was an independent and professional 
institution which combined novel ideas of popular and academic 
participation with the generally-political process of nominating and 
ratifying judges. However, within five years, political turmoil led 
to the promulgation of the Organic Law of the TSJ, which 
undermined the guarantees of judicial autonomy and independence 
in the Constitution of 1999.101  
An organic law is a law that functions as the framework for 
implementation of a constitutional regime.102 The concept of 
organic laws is foreign to American jurisprudence,103 but such laws 
are common throughout the world. Under the framework 
established by the Constitution of 1999, they regulate and structure 
government.104 Under the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999, 
organic laws required a two-thirds majority to be enacted.105 
Without securing a two-thirds majority, the MVR government 
enacted the Organic Law of the TSJ in 2004 (Ley Orgánica del 
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Tribunal Supremo de Justicia de la República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela) supported by only a simple majority in the 
legislature.106 According to Human Rights Watch, a non-
governmental organization which monitors and reports on 
international human rights, there were other procedural problems 
as well, such as the changing of the law’s text after it had been 
approved in the legislature and the combining of multiple articles 
to avoid debate in the legislature.107  
The 2004 Organic Law of the TSJ  had three important 
provisions: it permitted the nullification of temporary and 
provisional magistrates (discussed at length below); it raised the 
number of magistrates of the TSJ from twenty to thirty-two; and it 
changed the vote threshold for appointment of new magistrates.108 
Before the reform, half of the twenty magistrates were allied with 
the PSUV while the other half were in opposition, resulting in an 
equilibrium where decision were not entirely predictable.109 
However, after the reform, the twelve magistrates added to the TSJ 
where firmly allied with the MVR.110 Whereas the original twenty 
magistrates appointed under the Constitution of 1999 were all 
confirmed by a two-thirds majority, under the Organic Law, new 
magistrates and judges at all levels were appointed by a simple 
majority of the MVR-controlled legislature.111 This put the TSJ 
and all of its committees firmly in the hands of the MVR.  
The Organic Law was the MVR’s response to the TSJ’s 
supposed betrayal of the nation in 2002 and 2003. Despite having 
widespread support, President Chávez had a powerful and stubborn 
opposition. In April 2002, the opposition attempted a coup d’état 
against President Chávez.112 Though the coup seemed successful at 
first, within forty hours the PSUV government was restored.113 
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Then, in 2003, there were mass protests on the streets and a general 
strike against the government which cost billions of dollars in lost 
oil revenues for the state.114 As a result of those events, especially 
the failed coup, Chávez began dismantling the very Constitution he 
had fathered.115  
Four months after the failed coup in 2002, the TSJ ruled (in an 
eleven to nine decision) that it did not have jurisdiction to initiate 
an investigation against four high-ranking military generals 
suspected of being involved in the failed coup.116 President Chávez 
quickly organized street protests throughout the country, calling 
the decision a counterattack to his socialist revolution.117 He 
attacked the judicial vigorously, calling them “immoral,” 
“monstrous,” “a stain [on the country],” and calling for a book to 
be published with the pictures of the eleven magistrates who voted 
against investigation so that the people may know who they are.118 
In a post published at the time in an official MVR blog, Chávez’s 
son-in-law and current Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Jorge Arreaza, wrote that the TSJ was not a legitimate institution 
and claimed that the TSJ was biased and reached their decision 
based on the magistrates’ personal political views.119 However, in 
the same blog post he also concedes that the Attorney General 
made ineffective arguments.120  
Then, just a few months later, opposition politicians organized 
a general strike, which included a strike by workers of the state-
owned petroleum company, PDVSA.121 The PSUV government 
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considered the strike to be “petroleum terrorism” and an 
“economic coup d’état.”122 This led to another showdown with the 
judicial branch of government because the MVR believed that the 
lower courts–which were administered by the TSJ in accordance 
with the Constitution of 1999—did not prosecute participants in 
the strike with sufficient zealotry and severity.123 
The strategy employed by the Chavistas in 2004 was 
unconstitutional, but far from unique. Julius Caesar increased the 
Roman Senate from 600 members to 900 members to reduce 
opposition against him.124 Such actions are clearly designed to 
undermine the institution’s ability to assert autonomy in ways that 
are contrary to the politicians’ desires. One must also consider the 
effects that flaunting of constitutional norms can have on the 
courts. Courts are institutions that thrive on stability and 
establishment of rigorous norms. The combination of increasing 
the number of magistrates and disregarding the required procedure 
for appointing new magistrates are fatal blows to judicial stability. 
Unfortunately, these acts constitute the least egregious steps taken 
to undermine judicial autonomy. The discrete undermining of 
judicial authority would evolve into an open war of conquest 
against the judiciary. 
B.  Lack of Tenure: Temporary and Provisional Judges 
Become the Norm 
Judges are given tenure to prevent those who oversee them 
from exerting influence on the courts by using their power of 
appointment as leverage over individual judges. That is why many 
consider tenure to be an indispensable aspect of judicial autonomy. 
For example, in the United States, justices to the Supreme Court 
have tenure and politicians are powerless to stop a justice who 
“flips” and follows a different ideology from the one expected of 
him or her by the party that nominated them. In Venezuela, the 
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Constitution of 1999 created a regime which granted tenure to 
judges for twelve years and ensured their independence, but 
authorities dispensed with those constitutional guarantees for 
political convenience.125  
Of the tools used by the MVR government to bring the judicial 
under its control, the misuse of untenured temporary and 
provisional appointments is amongst the most effective. According 
to the Constitution of 1999, there are three ways to appoint 
magistrates to the TSJ. The first is intended to be the norm 
established by the constitution: legislative ratification of 
magistrates for tenured twelve-year terms through a public 
competition process.126 The second way, alternatively, is when a 
permanent position in the TSJ is vacated, it can be filled by a 
“provisional” appointment until that provisional judge can be 
confirmed through the public competition process established in 
the constitution and given tenure.127 The third type of appointments 
are “temporary” judges, those appointed to serve as substitutes for 
magistrates that are taking temporary leaves of absences for things 
like health reasons or parental leave.128  
Under the Constitution of 1999, the Judicial Commission of the 
TSJ has the power to appoint temporary and provisional judges.129 
It also has the power to dismiss temporary appointments without 
cause, but not provisional appointments.130 However, the 
Commission exercises that authority to dismiss provisional judges 
summarily, though that would apparently violate the Constitution, 
which specifically grants provisional judges a right to due process 
before being dismissed.131 Nevertheless, summary dismissal of 
provisional judges occurs as well. This gives the Judicial 
Commission significant power over judges. When the Commission 
has a judge’s career in their hands to do with as they please, it 
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becomes easier to ensure that judge’s compliance in exchange for 
receiving or retaining a judicial position. 
The effect of the policy of appointing mostly untenured judges 
is that “the independence of provisional [and temporary] judges is 
significantly destabilized, preventing them from making rulings 
based on the law rather than the desire of powerful outside 
actors.”132 The system of temporary and provisional appointments 
increases the leverage that politicians have over judges and forces 
judges to consider the political implications of their decisions 
before making them. It effectively gives the Judicial Commission, 
which is presided by a loyal Chavista, the ability to replace judges 
at will. There is no recourse for affected judges when the head 
magistrate of the TSJ is also a renown PSUV partisan.  
The president of the TSJ was Mr. Rincon, the very man who 
bent the Supreme Court to the Chavista’s will in 1998, and the 
president of the Judicial Commission of the TSJ, Luis Velazquez 
Alvaray, was a legislator and member of the PSUV before joining 
the TSJ.133 Together, they held the TSJ in a tight vice. 
In 2003, 80% of the judges in Venezuela held provisional or 
temporary positions.134 This means that out of the 1,772 judges in 
the country, only 183 were tenured.135 This represents a significant 
increase in the proportion of untenured judges since 1997.136 137 At 
first, President Chávez initiated a recruitment drive to hire judges 
to fill the positions held temporarily or provisionally, but the 
process was slow due to the strict standards set by the Constitution 
of 1999.138 By 2003, the government abruptly ended the attempt to 
fill the bench with tenured judges ostensibly because the process 
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was not working sufficiently well.139 However, opponents of the 
government argue that the recruitment drive was stopped shortly 
after the failed coup in 2002 so that the Judicial Commission of the 
TSJ could hold political control over the judicial by naming and 
removing judges at their discretion.140 The recruitment drive was 
never restarted.  
Meanwhile, the Judicial Commission has exercised its powers 
to appoint and remove nontenured judges by fiat. In 2004, it 
nullified the appointment of three Caracas judges who held 
temporary appointments without any due process, hearing, or 
notice.141 Other judges have reported to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights that they found their appointments 
revoked when they ruled against the government.142 While a 
magistrate may only be removed with two-thirds approval from the 
National Assembly, under the 2004 Organic Law, “nullification” 
of a temporary appointment can be achieved through a simple 
majority.143 The Organic Law allowed the purging of the 
Venezuelan judiciary to begin in earnest.  
The practice of using temporary appointments to control the 
judiciary violates the human rights of both the judge and the party 
who is seeking redress from the tribunal. Under the United 
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “[e]veryone is 
entitled in full equality to fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in determination of his rights 
and obligations.”144 Here, the person seeking recourse from the 
court is deprived of the ability to seek redress from an independent 
and impartial body where judges can adjudicate disputes free from 
outside influence and based solely on the application of law to 
facts. As for the judges, their performance is judged by the same 
political operators who appointed them. Those judges have no due 
 
 139 Id. at 1. 
 140 Id.  
 141 Castaldi, supra note 46, at 495. 
 142 Id. at 496. 
 143 See Wilkinson, supra note 101, at 18-20. 
 144 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 10., Dec. 10, 1948 
(emphasis added). 
2020] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 159 
 
process right to seek protection from arbitrary dismissal and many 
suspect that they were dismissed for political reasons.145 
The effect of such practices is very detrimental to judicial 
autonomy and democracy. Lack of tenure affects judges on a 
personal level, and without job security many of the brightest 
jurists in the country seek careers outside the judicial system and 
sometimes outside the country, where they will not be subject to 
the whims of the political class. The bright minds that decide to 
stay feel compelled by their careers to support Chavista political 
ideology in order to obtain temporary and provisional 
appointments. For those who stay within the judiciary and serve as 
judges, political oversight is a reality, and decisions are made not 
based on equity and the rule of law, but for the self-interest of the 
judge and the politicians who control his or her employment. 
When one considers that only a handful of exemplary victims are 
often enough to bring others into line, it becomes apparent just 
how powerful a tool the untenured appointments are for exercising 
control over the judicial.  
C.  The Purge: Summary Ousting of Judges 
After the failed coup in 2002, there was plenty of kindling to 
feed the fire that eventually consumed the Venezuelan judicial. 
The MVR blamed the judiciary for siding with the coup plotters, as 
the ten opposition-aligned TSJ magistrates of the twenty serving at 
the time had sided with the plotters during the attempted coup by 
declaring it legal.146 By 2004, Chávez and the MVR were secure 
enough to lead a counterattack against the judiciary.147 That is why 
in 2004, they instituted a regime of nullification through the 
aforementioned Organic Law of the TSJ which allowed the 
National Assembly to “nullify” appointments to the TSJ with a 
simple majority.148 As PSUV legislator Iris Varela said at the time, 
the regime of nullification was created specifically to expel the ten 
magistrates who had sided with the coup plotters.149 Her words 
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were an explicit confirmation that the goals of the controls placed 
on the judiciary in 2004 were to exercise political control over TSJ 
decisions and to punish magistrates accused of being aligned with 
the opposition.150 To that end, no tool was more useful than the 
ousting of sitting judges. 
The ousting of three Caracas trial judges for political reasons in 
2004 ushered in the era of summary dismissals. Miguel Luna, Petra 
Jimenez, and Maria Trastoy were dismissed on March 2004 after 
receiving letters from TSJ President Ivan Rincon Urdaneta 
“informing them that the TSJ Judicial Committee had decided to 
nullify their appointments.”151 They were removed “due to 
observations that were before [the TSJ Judicial Committee].”152 
However, those observations were never made public, and Human 
Rights Watch instead suggests that the firing was politically 
motivated.153 All three judges had released detainees who had 
allegedly participated in that year’s social unrest because there was 
insufficient evidence to warrant the ongoing detention of the 
suspects.154 The group included two opposition legislators.155 
Notably, the decisions of each judge were affirmed by the 
appellate court. When asked about the dismissals by Human Rights 
Watch, Ivan Rincon Urdaneta argued that the three judges were 
temporary appointments, and as such were not entitled to a hearing 
before dismissal.156 However, none had temporary appointments. 
Instead, Luna and Trastoy were provisional appointments 
specifically entitled to due process under the Constitution of 1999, 
while Jimenez was appointed as a “Special Substitute” and had 
been serving at her post for more than three years at the time of her 
dismissal.157  
All three judges appealed their dismissal, but only Luna 
received a response (first she was reinstated and then summarily 
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dismissed once more shortly thereafter).158 Particularly worrisome 
is the fact that the Caracas judges’ rulings enforced the laws 
correctly—as shown by their subsequent confirmation on appeal—
and were only problematic because of their pollical significance. 
Also worrisome is that their nullifications used a law that, 
according to PSUV legislator Iris Valera, was created specifically 
for the removal of opposition-aligned judges.159 Such arbitrary 
dismissal of judges with the express intent to undermine judicial 
autonomy is both unconstitutional and in violation of Venezuela’s 
human rights treaty obligations to ensure that people have access to 
autonomous and independent courts that will adjudicate questions 
of rights and obligations. 
Although provisional judges are entitled to due process 
hearings before being dismissed, the TSJ showed in 2004 that it 
would not apply such protections and treat provisional 
appointments the same as temporary ones. In a country were about 
80% of the judges serve under either provisional or temporary 
appointments, this means that the vast majority of judges can be 
removed with no explanation or opportunity to defend 
themselves.160 In other words, “the constitutional regime does not 
apply to a majority of the judges on the bench in Venezuela.”161   
Before the dismissal of the three Caracas judges, an early 
victim of the opening salvo of the war against judicial autonomy 
was temporary Judge Mercedes Chocron. Judge Chocron 
attempted to carry out a judicial inspection of a military base 
where an opposition-aligned general was being held to ensure that 
his detention complied with human rights treaty obligations set by 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.162 After that, 
she was dismissed by the TSJ Judicial Commission, which gave no 
reasoning other than their absolute authority to dismiss temporary 
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judges.163 They noted that such dismissals “cannot be questioned 
or subject to review.”164 
In other cases, MVR politicians intimidated entire courts and 
then dismissed them altogether. Such was the fate of the First 
Administrative Court (“CPCA”), the second highest court in 
Venezuela, which had national jurisdiction over cases involving 
challenges to administrative actions by the government.165 Due to 
its occasional rulings against MVR policies, President Chávez 
publicly denounced the CPCA on several occasions. For example, 
in response to a 2003 ruling that Cuban doctors sent by the Cuban 
government to work as volunteers in poor communities could not 
practice medicine in Venezuela without first being certified by the 
Venezuelan medical association, he called it “judges who 
shouldn’t be judges,” even telling it to go shove their rulings 
“where you want,” and encouraging the people to ignore CPCA 
decisions.166 
Before taking the drastic step of dissolving the CPCA, the 
MVR government attempted to intimidate that court into 
submission. Aside from the insults mentioned above, President 
Chávez called the chief judge of the CPCA a “criminal.”167 
Intelligence services arrested one of the judge’s driver and held 
him in prison for thirty-five days.168 The driver was charged with 
mishandling documents under the pretense that the documents that 
he carried on the day of his arrest, which were seized by police 
officers during the arrest, had fallen into the hands of third parties 
(i.e. the arresting officers themselves). Despite the driver’s later 
acquitted by the TSJ (which at this point still had only twenty 
magistrates), the arrest is viewed by many as an attempted 
intimidation.169 Later that year, the public prosecutor conducted a 
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surprise search of the CPCA courthouse accompanied by heavily 
armed police.170 
In 2003, the TSJ shut down the CPCA and dismissed its four 
sitting judges.171 Based on a recommendation submitted to it by the 
Inspector General of the Judiciary, the TSJ determined that an 
“inexcusable error” in a decision rendered the year before was 
grounds for the dismissal of the judges.172 Three of the judges 
appealed the decision, but their appeals were ignored by the TSJ.173 
When asked why the appeals had been ignored, TSJ President 
Rincon Urdaneta explained that their appeals were “not a high 
priority” and asserted that new judges would be appointed to take 
over the CPCA.174 However, to this day, the CPCA remains 
shut.175 This political maneuver has had the effect of entirely 
removing the means for popular redress against administrative 
laws, reducing overall access to justice for the Venezuelan people 
and seriously undermining the principles of democratic 
government.  
The summary firing of judges is effective because it works on 
many different levels simultaneously. On the most basic level, 
firing a “problematic” judge gets rid of a political enemy. To those 
who do not value the independent judicial and see the judicial as 
another branch of government in which to wage partisan warfare, 
that goal presents sufficiently strong motivation. The flip side of it 
is yet another benefit for the partisan politicians, as the MVR can 
fill empty seats with government supporters who will tow the party 
line. While summarily dismissed judges are visible victims of the 
government’s policy, those who remain are the silent victims that 
must suffer intimidation constantly. Every fired judge becomes yet 
another example to sitting judges of the consequences of incurring 
the government’s wrath. The fear of losing one’s job becomes 
amplified as empty posts are filled with partisans who are 
searching for new “traitors.” “Furthermore, because they can be 
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freely removed, . . . judges are more susceptible to both political 
and private pressures” when making rulings.176 The ultimate effect 
of the policy of arbitrary dismissal of judges is that judicial 
autonomy is significantly undermined, preventing judges from 
making ruling based on the law rather than the desires of powerful 
outside actors.177 
D.  All the Strategies Come Together: The Case of Judge 
Maria Lourdes Afiuni 
Although the war against the independent judiciary in 
Venezuela first gained steam in the years following the failed coup 
of 2002, it continued uninterrupted for many years after that. Not 
only did the events mentioned above still affect judges many years 
later, but new attacks against judges and efforts to politicize the 
judiciary were launched. Perhaps none is as illustrative, colorful, 
and heartbreaking as the case of Judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni.  
On December 2009, Judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni was 
imprisoned on charges of fraud after incurring the wrath of 
President Hugo Chávez.178 The president’s anger was forceful and 
aggressive. He called her a “bandit” and demanded that the judge 
“be sentenced to a [thirty]-year prison term, even if new legislation 
was required to achieve that result.”179 The charges against Judge 
Afiuni came just days after she granted habeas corpus and 
conditionally released Eligio Cadeño, a prominent Chavista banker 
who was awaiting trial for evading government currency controls 
and diverting resources by requesting twenty-seven million (USD) 
in foreign currency to import goods which he never imported to the 
country.180  
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Under Venezuelan law, a suspected criminal may be held in 
pretrial detention for a maximum of two years before charges must 
be pressed or the suspect released.181 By his release on December 
2009, Mr. Cedeño had spent two years and ten months in pretrial 
detention without a trial being undertaken against him.182 This was 
a violation of Mr. Cadeño’s constitutional rights as well as 
international treaty obligations to guarantee speedy trials where an 
accused could defend himself against the charges alleged against 
him. By the time of his release, Mr. Cadeño’s imprisonment had 
been noticed and condemned by multiple international human 
rights organizations. Independent experts on human rights from the 
United Nation’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention had 
condemned Mr. Cadeño’s treatment as early as September of that 
year.183 Judge Afiuni granted Cadeño conditional release while 
awaiting trial, and just a few days later she “was arrested by 
intelligence police officers.”184 Her crime, according to observers, 
was enforcing Venezuela’s constitutional and international due 
process obligations against the wishes of President Chávez.185 
According to media reports, President Chávez had a special 
interest in the case against Mr. Cadeño, and an ax to grind against 
the defendant. In 2003, Rosa Virginia, one of Chávez’s two 
daughters began dating Gustavo Arraiz, a business partner of Mr. 
Cadeño.186 During that time, Rosa Virginia and Gustavo allegedly 
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filmed themselves having intimate relations.187 Local media 
reported that the video found its way to the hands of President 
Chávez, who accused Mr. Cedeño of using the video to blackmail 
the President.188 After this alleged attempt to blackmail, Mr. 
Cedeño was imprisoned without trial until his release by Judge 
Afiuni.189 Immediately upon release, Cedeño fled to the United 
States where he was given asylum.190  
The truth of the media allegations is unproven, since the matter 
was never brought to trial. What is beyond dispute, however, is 
that Mr. Cadeño was held without trial for a period of ten months 
beyond the allowable maximum time.191 MVR politicians failed to 
see that the problem was not Judge Afiuni, who followed the law, 
but those who attempted to do something which was illegal. The 
punishment meted out to Judge Afiuni for her refusal to aid and 
abet the government in violating the law was a travesty.  
Judge Afiuni was imprisoned from 2009 until 2013 because of 
her actions in the Cedeño Case.192 Shortly after her arrest by 
intelligence forces, President Chávez appeared on national 
television and radio calling her a bandit, asking for new legislation 
that would allow the government to punish Judge Afiuni more 
severely, and expressly instructed the attorney general and 
president of the TSJ to punish her as severely as possible “to 
prevent similar actions by other judges.”193 Afiuni was charged 
with corruption, accessory to an escape, criminal conspiracy, and 
abuse of power.194 
Mr. Cedeño’s lawyers were publicly accused of engaging in 
criminal conduct.195 One of those attorneys, as well as the two 
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bailiffs that escorted Mr. Cedeño out of court were briefly arrested 
as well.196 Judge Afiuni was imprisoned in a women’s prison along 
with many convicts that she had sent to that same prison.197 In the 
same year, another judge from the court of appeals was demoted 
after ruling that Mr. Cedeño’s pretrial detention had exceeded the 
legal limit.198 
International non-governmental organizations were quick to 
condemn the actions taken by the government against Judge Afiuni 
as violations of her human rights. Human rights experts from the 
UN called the treatment of Judge Afiuni “a blow by President 
Hugo Chávez to the independence of judges and lawyers in the 
country.”199 They further stated that “‘[r]eprisals for exercising 
their constitutionally guaranteed functions and creating a climate 
of fear among the judiciary and lawyers’ profession serve no 
purpose except to undermine the rule of law and obstruct               
justice . . . . The immediate and unconditional release of Judge 
Afiuni is imperative.’”200  
In response to the Afiuni Case, the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights criticized “the absence of an 
effective separation and independence of the public branches of 
power in Venezuela.”201 The international watchdog Human Rights 
Watch also criticized the detention as it led to the “‘dramatic 
erosion of judicial independence in Venezuela under Chávez” and 
considered that “it is very difficult to expect that she will get a fair 
trial.’”202 
Judge Afiuni’s treatment is a clear violation of her human 
rights to recourse to a fair tribunal and protection from torture. 
Judge Afiuni, who has since been conditionally released, claims 
that she was the victim of physical, emotional, and sexual 
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torture.203 In a 2015 filling to the United Nations in Geneva, Judge 
Afiuni and her lawyers alleged, and presented evidence to prove, 
that authorities destroyed her anus, vagina, and bladder by raping 
and sexually torturing her.204 She claims that once she was beat 
with such savagery that a boot kick from a National Guardsman 
destroyed one of her breasts as well.205 According to Afiuni, prison 
officials intentionally placed women she had convicted in the cell 
next to hers and that those women would regularly beat her and on 
multiple occasions threw gasoline into her cell in order to light a 
fire and roast her alive.206 Prison authorities did nothing to stop the 
harassment when she complained.207 On another occasion, Judge 
Afiuni was transferred to a hospital for a gynecological procedure 
and was forced to strip naked in front of 20 National 
Guardsmen.208 Attorney General Luisa Ortega Diaz denied 
Afiuni’s claims in a UN hearing.209  
Judge Afiuni was conditionally released in 2013 and is 
prohibited from leaving the country.210 She describes her treatment 
by saying that “in six years they destroyed my life, my daughter’s 
life, and my whole family.”211 Surely, few people would risk 
exposing themselves to the horrors that Judge Afiuni faced.  
Judge Afiuni’s case brings together all the strategies employed 
by the MVR government since 1999 to undermine judicial 
autonomy and destroy democracy in the country. She was removed 
from office easily, thanks to her untenured position and the 
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executive’s authority to do so under the Organic Law of 2004. Her 
court was bullied and intimidated when one of the lawyers 
involved and the bailiffs who released Cadeño were arrested. Judge 
Afiuni was publicly criticized, then arrested and intimidated 
through torture. The message to all other judges in the country was 
clear: the president expected compliance from the judiciary, and he 
would stop at nothing to get it.  
Judge Afiuni’s case illustrates how the use of the strategies 
discussed above undermine constitutional government to such an 
extent as to turn an otherwise-democratic government into a 
despotic tyranny. When a president has so much power to control 
the judiciary, it cannot be said that such a president may be bound 
by the democratic limitation placed upon them by their nation’s 
constitution. Consequently, this reality violates the people’s human 
right to access fair courts that will apply due process of law. 
IV. 2017: THE YEAR THE TSJ AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
GOVERNMENT BROKE DOWN 
From the establishment of the TSJ in 1999 until 2017, the 
various attacks against the Venezuelan judicial ate at its 
foundations like termites until it collapsed. In 2017, the TSJ 
removed the final façade of constitutional legitimacy by allowing 
President Maduro to unilaterally call another Constituent 
Assembly and by a series of rulings that held that the legislative 
powers of the National Assembly now belonged to the unilaterally-
convened Constituent Assembly.212  
President Maduro was the hand-picked successor of Hugo 
Chavez who died of cancer in March 2013 after a long fight with 
the disease.213 Nicolas Maduro, a high school drop-out turned 
union organizer took over the reins of power in Venezuela.214  
President Maduro’s use of the Venezuelan judiciary as a 
weapon in his war against opposition politicians began after the 
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2015 elections, which saw the MVR lose control of the legislature 
for the first time in their sixteen years of power.215 After that 
election, Maduro began to strike at the legislature by expanding 
executive power further than Chavez ever had.216 Taking 
advantage of the economic crisis facing the country, President 
Maduro unilaterally granted himself emergency powers for sixty 
days.217 Under Article 339 of the 1999 Constitution, Maduro was 
well within his rights to do so, as well as to unilaterally extend 
those emergency powers for another sixty-day term.218 However, 
the constitution explicitly prohibits the extension of the term 
beyond 120 days without approval by the National Assembly.219  
After the 120-day period of his initial declaration, President 
Maduro simply gave himself unilateral emergency powers for 
another sixty days, extended that power another sixty days, and 
repeated the process as needed.220 In this way, President Maduro 
has maintained emergency powers for over two years, executing 
over thirteen emergency decrees in that time.221 During that time, 
President Maduro exercised both executive and legislative powers, 
passing laws that had little to do with fixing the crisis-stricken 
economy and took few steps to solve the economic emergency that 
served as the pretext for his expanded powers.222  
Despite the blackletter law of Article 339 that clearly prohibits 
the president from unilaterally invoking emergency powers for 
more than 120 days, the TSJ ruled that those powers may be 
renewed perennially by President Maduro.223 As a matter of fact, 
while the Constitution explicitly grants the National Assembly the 
right to revoke emergency powers under Article 339, the TSJ 
prohibited the National Assembly from exercising that power, 
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using the argument that the National Assembly was illegal and 
therefore did not have that right. 224 Acceso a la Justicia, a 
Venezuelan NGO which tracks justice and judicial independence 
in Venezuela, explained the TSJ’s actions eloquently when they 
wrote that it is “very clear that the [TSJ] performs a role opposite 
of its mandate, by permitting the disintegration of the Carta Magna 
[Constitution] with unconstitutional states of exception [i.e. 
emergency powers] when its function under Article 334 is to 
ensure the integrity of the Constitution.”225 
Following the opposition’s electoral victory in the legislative 
elections of December 2015, the TSJ took the unusual step of 
nullifying the election of four opposition-aligned legislators from 
the state of Amazonas before they could swear-in the following 
January, on the grounds that “irregularities” had taken place in 
their elections.226 Without those four deputies, the opposition fell 
short of a two-thirds majority in the legislature.227 The TSJ 
decision came just one day after a petition claiming irregularities in 
the election process was filed by Nicia Maldonado, a former 
minister of the environment in Chávez’s cabinet who had lost the 
election against one of the four legislators now barred from 
office.228 Many jurists and NGOs were quick to criticize the TSJ 
decision, as the election had already been completed and ratified, 
so according to the Constitution of 1999, the TSJ’s jurisdiction 
over electoral affairs did not apply to the case at hand.229 Further, 
the TSJ decision came over the National Assembly’s Christmas 
vacation and there was no way for a fair hearing to be held before 
the inauguration of the new legislature in early January.230 
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Therefore, the National Assembly allowed the deputies from 
Amazonas to take their office.231 
In January, the TSJ ordered the National Assembly to expel the 
four deputies in question or be dissolved.232 This was again in 
response to a request by Ms. Maldonado which was reviewed and 
ruled on within a mere four days by the Electoral Committee of the 
TSJ.233 The National Assembly was forced to comply, and the 
deputies were suspended from their posts.234 The deputies that 
were suspended appealed to the TSJ, which took 211 days to 
answer their appeal by merely confirming that they were currently 
suspended.235 The decision was “contrary to the express justice in 
favor of the PSUV.” 236 The seats remained empty for the duration 
of the National Assembly’s term, until that entire body was 
subsequently ordered to dissolve by the TSJ.237 
At this early point in the legislative wars, a series of TSJ 
decisions clarified its PSUV-aligned stance. Early in 2016 the TSJ 
confirmed the constitutionality of President Maduro’s perennial 
unilateral grant of emergency powers.238 They cited statutes to 
argue that, despite the text of the Constitution, those statutes 
prohibited the TSJ from intervening in cases where emergency 
powers are invoked.239 Around the same time, the TSJ rendered 
another decision that directly contradicted the text of the 
Constitution, which established a process by which the executive 
must present a periodic accounting of his or her actions to the 
legislature.240 They ruled that the National Assembly had no 
authority to oversee the executive and that President Maduro was 
not legally required to account for his actions to the legislature, just 
to himself.241  
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The TSJ’s August 2016 decision to dissolve the National 
Assembly was a watershed moment in the constitutional history of 
Venezuela. Seizing on the purported irregularities in the election of 
the deputies from Amazonas, the TSJ refused to confirm the new 
legislature.242 This limbo lasted until the summer, when the 
President of the National Assembly submitted the credentials of 
the deputies elected to the National Assembly yet again, but this 
time excluding the deputies from Amazonas.243 Five days later, the 
TSJ dissolved the entire National Assembly and declared it 
“invalid [and] inexistent”; its laws having no judicial 
enforceability.244  It argued that the second inauguration of the 
deputies had been irregular and therefore every legislation passed 
by it was invalid.245 In early 2017, the National Assembly held 
another inauguration where it tried to appease the TSJ and obtain 
its approval.246 However, the TSJ found new irregularities in the 
process and dissolved the National Assembly once more, ruling 
that all National Assembly decisions and legislation in 2017 were 
voided as well.247 
During this period, the TSJ struck down the National Assembly 
often. In 2016, it closed an investigation into corruption in the 
national petroleum company (known by its Spanish-language 
acronym, PDVSA) undertaken by opposition deputies arguing that 
the investigation “was not in the country’s best interest.”248 
Instead, it directed the executive branch to investigate Deputy 
Freddy Guevara, the legislator who had spearheaded the 
investigation into PDVSA.249 In another decision they allowed the 
executive to incur debts and sell state assets without legislative 
approval as required by law.250 In 2016 the TSJ began filling 
empty seats in the National Election Council–the supposedly 
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independent branch of government that is tasked with overseeing 
elections–though that power was expressly granted to the National 
Assembly by the Constitution. However, during this period the 
most consequential ruling of the TSJ was the approval of the 
Constituent Assembly.251 
In a decree published on May 2017, President Maduro invoked 
the powers of the presidency to unilaterally invoke a Constituent 
Assembly to craft a new constitution.252 The Constitution of 1999 
sets clear rules for both the amending and the replacement of that 
constitution.253 It requires that any change be approved by the 
president, a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, and a 
majority vote in a referendum where at least fifteen percent of 
registered voters participated.254 The 2017 decree did not have the 
latter two approvals.255 Instead, the TSJ relied on an inexplicably 
absurd interpretation of the language, based on the positioning of a 
single comma in the text of the constitution read entirely outside 
the context of the document, to rule that the requirements above 
are necessary for an amendment to the constitution but not for 
replacing it entirely.256 That interpretation completely ignored the 
text of the constitution, which explicitly states elsewhere that the 
popular will must be manifested before a constituent assembly can 
be called.257 The TSJ’s interpretation effectively created an entirely 
new procedure for replacing the constitution that was not included 
in the constitution.258 Brewer-Carias plainly calls the ruling a 
“constitutional fraud.”259 He points out that according to the TSJ’s 
decision, there would need to be a popular referendum, two-thirds 
legislative approval, and executive approval to change a single 
letter in the constitution, but that the constitution can be wholly 
thrown out and replaced based only on the president’s unilateral 
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decree.260 He calls the decision a “constitutional aberration” and a 
“usurpation of popular will” that is “arbitrarily assigned to the 
President.”261 The 1999 Constitution, which placed a large 
emphasis and importance on popular participation, is incompatible 
with the TSJ ruling. 262 
The TSJ supported President Maduro’s efforts to create 
Constituent Assembly at every turn. Aside from their interpretation 
granting legality to the president’s decree, other rulings ensured 
that the MVR retained actual power.263  The first decision dealt 
with the election of members for the Constituent Assembly.264 
President Maduro had proposed a voting system by which voters 
are divided into economic sectors and voting groups were based on 
a voter’s profession.265 Despite another law, which stipulated that 
the popular will shall be measured in a popular vote, the TSJ ruled 
that no voting system is perfect and Maduro’s proposal was 
legal.266 Observers were quick to note that members of the poor 
working classes that traditionally supported Chavismo had an 
insurmountable advantage when they could vote in this way.267 
Indeed, Maduro’s partisans won every single seat in the 
Constituent Assembly.268 Once elected, the exclusively Chavista 
Constituent Assembly was invested with full legislative powers.269 
It now sits in “illegal substitution of parliament” and approves 
laws, including the national budget, strips National Assembly 
deputies of their parliamentary immunity, orders investigations, 
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and carries out other activities reserved for the National Assembly 
under the Constitution.270 
When the Constituent Assembly was vested with legislative 
powers, the constitutional order had broken down irreparably. 
Luisa Ortega Diaz, the attorney general who denied Judge Afiuni’s 
torture allegations just a couple of years before, left her post and 
attempted to fight the new order through the courts, but achieved 
very little success.271 Her husband, a legislator from the PSUV, 
joined her in protesting the new order.272 He was stripped of his 
parliamentary immunity by the TSJ and indicted on corruption 
charges.273  
As a response to the subordination of the judicial power in 
Venezuela, and as a result of the TSJ’s lack of legitimacy, an 
opposition-aligned TSJ was inaugurated at the OAS headquarters 
in Washington D.C.274  The National Assembly’s eighteen 
nominees to the TSJ, which had been rejected because the TSJ 
considered the National Assembly nullified, began working in the 
parallel TSJ along with another fifteen magistrates.275 President 
Maduro immediately ordered the arrest of all thirty-three 
magistrates on charges of usurping the judicial power.276 All of the 
magistrates escaped, except for one magistrate who was arrested 
by intelligence services before escaping the country and charged 
with treason in a military court, despite the fact that he was not a 
member of the military.277 According to the International Human 
Rights Court, military jurisdiction must be limited to members of 
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the military or to “crimes or offenses that based on their own 
nature threaten the juridical rights of the military order itself.”278 
The parallel TSJ holds session outside of Venezuela, and its 
rulings are binding to the extent that they are recognized by 
international organizations.279 
V. CONCLUSION: THE CURRENT AND FUTURE VENEZUELAN 
JUDICIARY 
At what point must one acknowledge that judicial 
independence and democracy in Venezuela does not exist? Surely, 
in its current state with a parallel supreme court and parallel 
legislatures, there is no escaping the conclusion that the current 
state of the Venezuelan judiciary is in utter disrepair and 
representative democracy does not exist. 
The first blow to the judiciary was not ill-intentioned and did 
not necessitate the final collapse, it was the election of Chávez and 
the subsequent creation of the Constitution of 1999. That 
constitution respected the separation of powers and guaranteed 
human rights to the people of Venezuela. It came after decades of 
neglect of the poor by the political class and was intended to 
ensure a more equitable country. However, by replacing rather 
than amending the old constitution, the door was left open to the 
imposition of charisma over law. The decisions to bend the rules to 
ensure their political goal of a new constitution confirmed to the 
MVR that while they remained popular, they could undermine the 
institutions of government. The new constitution also created the 
Constituent Assembly process for drafting a new constitution. This 
power was ultimately usurped by President Maduro and used to 
sideline the National Assembly. 
The next blow came with the Organic Law which the MVR 
enacted illegally and used to pack the court with their supporters. It 
opened the door to the widespread use of untenured appointments 
and nullification of magistrates. Unlike the Constitution of 1999, 
the Organic Law could not be said to be the product of good 
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intentions. The goal of the law was specifically to ensure the 
loyalty of the judiciary and to give the MVR the ability to remove 
judges that did not follow directions. It was clearly intended for the 
exercise of political control over the judiciary. 
The widespread use of temporary appointments was a blow to 
judicial independence and freedom. One that was much more 
damaging than those which preceded it. The decision to appoint 
judges temporarily and provisionally so as to deny them tenure is 
largely responsible for the current state of the Venezuelan judicial. 
Judges became afraid to make rulings according to their 
conscience. Eventually, the careers of over eighty percent of the 
country’s judges depended on the whims of those in power.280 
Politicians used that power to nefariously control the judiciary.  
The ouster of judges had a similar and intertwined detrimental 
effect on the Venezuelan judiciary. The ousting of judges goes 
hand-in-hand with the temporary appointments because the 
Organic Law permitted the nullification of untenured posts. 
However, failure to renew a post does not have the same effect as 
firing a person from that post. Seeing the ouster of judges who 
were supposed to be protected by the constitution was a powerful 
deterrent against ignoring the will of the MVR.  
The case of Judge Afiuni is similarly terrifying from the 
perspective of a judge in Venezuela. Ms. Afiuni was punished for 
following the law in accordance with a prisoner’s human rights. 
For that “crime” she was imprisoned for many years, tortured, and 
raped. This is a textbook example of using force as a deterrent, 
except that it was perversely applied to a judge and not a criminal. 
By extension, it was also applied to all judges in Venezuela, 
because they all witnessed the sacrificial lamb on its way to 
slaughter. 
If the Venezuelan judiciary can be said to have survived the 
early 2000s and the Afiuni case, there is no dispute that it did not 
survive the legislative war of 2016-2017. By that point, the TSJ 
was so eroded that they simply used circular logic to ensure 
whatever outcome was politically palatable. Its attempts to 
delegitimize the National Assembly had that very effect on itself. 
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The judiciary pushed the country towards having parallel 
legislatures and parallel supreme courts.  
While the Constitution of 1999 was not destined to fail, the 
way that it has been implemented means it must be entirely 
replaced. Although the public participation for selecting judges 
may be salvaged from the Constitution of 1999, any new 
constitution should do away with provisional judgeships, should 
ensure that all judges and citizens be entitled to due process under 
the law, and should prohibit acts of public intimidation to influence 
judges. However, first there must be a political revolution to 
wrestle power away from the MVR and return it to the people. 
 
